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ABSTRACT: Recent interest in the idea that there can be scientific understanding without explanation lends new rele-
vance to Duhem's notion of natural classification. According to Duhem, a classification that is natural 
teaches us something about nature without being explanatory. However, his conception of naturalness 
leaves much to be desired from the point of view of contemporary discussions. In this paper, I argue that 
we can measure the naturalness of classification by using an amended version of the notion of unification 
as defined by Schurz and Lambert. If this thesis is correct, it leads to a better conceptual understanding of 
scientific understanding, and also gives the nascent literature on this topic some much-needed precision. 
Keywords: unification; understanding; explanation; natural classification; Pierre Duhem. 
RESUMEN: El reciente interés en la idea de que puede haber comprensión científica sin explicación renueva la rele-
vancia de la noción de clasificación natural propuesta por Pierre Duhem. Según este autor, una clasificación 
que es natural nos enseña algo sobre la naturaleza sin ser explicativa. Sin embargo, su concepción de “natu-
ralidad” deja bastante que desear desde la perspectiva de las discusiones contemporáneas. En el artículo ra-
zono que podemos medir la naturalidad de una clasificación mediante una versión retocada de la noción de 
unificación, tal como es definida por Schurz y Lambert. Si dicha tesis es correcta, se logra un mejor enten-
dimiento de la comprensión científica; y también se gana, para la naciente literatura sobre este tópico, una 
precisión sumamente deseable. 
Palabras clave: unificación; explicación; clasificación natural; Pierre Duhem. 
1. Introduction 
In the past few years, philosophers of science have become interested in the topic of 
scientific understanding as separate from that of scientific explanation. Several authors 
argue that there may be understanding without explanation (e.g. De Regt 2001, 2009; 
De Regt & Dieks 2005; Lipton 2009; Gijsbers 2013). But the idea that we can gain 
understanding of nature without being able to explain the phenomena is not new: it 
can already be found in Pierre Duhem’s seminal The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory 
(1991 [1914]). In that book, Duhem makes a distinction between explanation and clas-
sification. He then rejects explanation as an aim of science; but suggests that classifica-
tions, when they are natural classifications, can nevertheless give us insight into what is 
really going on in nature. 
 Even though his criticism of explanation is outdated given contemporary ideas 
about explanations, Duhem’s conception of the distinction between explanation and 
natural classification is not. Natural classification is a good candidate for non-
explanatory understanding, and as such is a topic of considerable interest for a       
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philosopher of science. However, Duhem’s own characterisation of naturalness leaves 
much to be desired. If we wish to use his ideas, we must come up with another con-
ception of naturalness. Following a suggestion in Gijsbers (2013) that successful clas-
sification might be identified with unification, I want to explore the possibility that we 
already possess a measure of the naturalness of a classification: it is the notion of uni-
fication developed in Schurz and Lambert (1994). 
 In section 2, I will present Duhem’s thinking about explanation and natural classi-
fication, and point out some problems with his conception. This will not only acquaint 
us with the intuitions underlying the idea of naturalness, but it will also allow us to 
formulate a list of desiderata for a measure of naturalness. I will then present a simpli-
fied and amended version of Schurz and Lambert’s theory of unification (section 3), 
and I will argue that it matches the formulated desiderata (section 4). 
 This conclusion supports the idea that successful classification and unification can 
be identified with each other, which Gijsbers (2012) arrived at using very different rea-
soning. If correct, it would also mean that we can apply the technically sophisticated 
and quasi-quantitative tools that were developed by Schurz and Lambert in the con-
text of unification to the topics of classification and understanding. 
2. Duhem’s notion of natural classification 
The locus classicus of the idea that there can be scientifically important classification that 
gives understanding but not explanation is Pierre Duhem’s The Aim and Structure of 
Physical Theory (1991 [1914]). At the beginning of his book, Duhem describes two dif-
ferent ways of thinking about physical theories. Some people believe that physical 
theories explain experimental laws, and that the aim of physical theory is explanation. 
Others believe that the aim of physical theory is to summarize and classify experimental 
laws. Duhem, then, starts with a sharp distinction between explanation and classifica-
tion; and he goes on to argue that aiming for explanation is entirely mistaken. 
 We must note that Duhem’s notion of explanation is much more metaphysical 
than that of contemporary philosophers. To explain, he writes, is “to strip reality of 
the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself” (p. 7). Ex-
plaining thus commits the explainer to an appearance-reality distinction, to the idea 
that we can get some kind of epistemic access to the bare reality behind the appear-
ances, and to the idea that every explanation is a description of this bare reality. 
 Based on this metaphysical conception of explanation, Duhem argues that it can-
not be an aim of science. For, he points out, whether something can be accepted as an 
explanation or not depends not just on our scientific discoveries, but even more on 
our basic metaphysical theories about the nature of bare reality. Duhem then sketches 
a bleak picture of the endless and undecidable battles between the metaphysical 
schools of the atomists, the Cartesians, the Newtonians and the Aristotelians. If we 
want our sciences to exhibit progress—and of course we do—we must not make 
them dependent on metaphysics. Metaphysics is merely a source of unending differ-
ences of opinion, a quagmire into which anyone unwise enough to seek explanations 
will surely sink. 
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 This criticism of explanation has little bearing on contemporary discussions of the 
topic. Unlike Duhem, few philosophers now believe that all explanation consists in 
scientific facts being explained by underlying metaphysical principles. Most current 
theories of explanation (from Hempel’s DN-model to Kitcher’s unificationism and 
Woodward’s interventionism) take as paradigm cases the explanation of events by 
other events, or of regularities by other regularities, two cases to which a metaphysical 
appearance-reality distinction seems entirely unimportant. Some theorists, like Salmon 
and Craver, do emphasize what we could describe as finding initially “hidden” mecha-
nisms that are responsible for the “apparent” phenomena; but they believe that those 
mechanisms will be found by empirical science, not by metaphysical reflection. Our 
conception of explanation has changed since Duhem was writing; and we therefore 
will not wish to adopt his rejection of explanation. 
 But Duhem’s distinction between explanation and classification remains interest-
ing. So let us go on to discuss his notion of classification. 
 Duhem gives the following, oft-quoted, definition of a physical theory: 
It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which 
aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws.  
(p. 19) 
 One of the uses of physical theory so conceived is to aid the human mind in re-
membering and using all the knowledge of nature it has acquired (p. 21). But, Duhem 
argues, a physical theory is more than just an economical representation of the exper-
imental results: it is also a ‘classification’ (p. 23). What is a classification? 
 In any physical domain, many experimental laws will be found. Physical theory 
groups some of these laws together; it gives us, “so to speak, the table of contents and 
the chapter headings under which the science to be studied will be methodically divid-
ed, and it indicates the laws which are to be arranged under each of these chapters” (p. 
23-24). Using a different metaphor, Duhem likens a physical theory to a utility cabinet 
where all the tools used for a single task are grouped together. In that way, the physi-
cist can easily find his tools, and can check that he has not forgotten to apply any of 
the suitable tools. For instance, if the physicist knows that he is studying a diffraction 
phenomenon, he will only have to look under that heading: he will not lose time trying 
to apply laws pertaining to refraction or reflection, and he will not forget to use any of 
the diffraction laws. 
 This is a classification. But a successful theory—and we will look at the criterion of 
success in a moment—persuades us that it is more than merely an arbitrary filing sys-
tem; it persuades us that it is a natural classification. A natural classification is a classifi-
cation where 
those ideal connections established by [the scientist’s] reason among abstracted conceptions cor-
respond to real relations among the associated [phenomena] brought together and embodied in 
his abstractions. (p. 25) 
 For instance, a zoologist classifies the vertebrates. If the grouping he arrives at—
say, a grouping in which the whales are closer to the hippopotami than to the fishes—
corresponds to a real relation among the actual animals, this classification is a natural 
classification. But, and this is crucial for the difference that Duhem makes between 
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explanation and classification, the zoologist doesn’t have to know what this real rela-
tion is; he doesn't even have to have any idea or hypothesis about it; and if he does 
have an idea about it, it doesn’t matter if it is wrong. Considering the idea that the real 
relation underlying the classification of vertebrates is that of closeness in the evolu-
tionary tree, Duhem writes: 
And if physiology and paleontology should someday demonstrate to [the zoologist] that the rela-
tionship imagined by him cannot be, that the evolutionist hypothesis is controverted, he would 
continue to believe that the plan drawn by his classification depicts real relations among animals; 
he would admit being deceived about the nature of these relations but not about their existence. 
(p. 25) 
 Whether we accept a classification as natural is therefore not dependent on our 
knowing which real relations are captured by the ideal relations of our theory. The un-
derstanding we gain from classification can be integrated into an explanatory theory of 
reality, but can also exist alone, and it will survive the rejection of any and even all ex-
planations. 
 A natural classification, then, is a classification that captures the reality of nature 
without making explanatory claims. But why would we ever accept a classification as 
natural, given that, according to Duhem, we do not have access to the real relations 
themselves? It is the success of the classification that makes scientists believe it is natu-
ral, that its logical order reflects the ontological order of nature (p. 26). 
 What criterion of success does Duhem have in mind? Minimally, the classification 
must be an economical system for classifying the experimental laws. But there is an-
other kind of success that, according to Duhem, makes us especially likely to believe 
that the classification is natural: predictive success. A sufficiently rich theory will allow us 
to deduce new experimental consequences that are not consequences of the hitherto 
established experimental laws. These consequences can be tested. Using an argument 
that strongly resembles the no miracle argument for scientific realism (see for instance 
Psillos 1999, p. 70ff), Duhem claims that if a classification is merely an arbitrary sys-
tem of categorisation, such predictions are highly unlikely to be true; but that if the 
classification corresponds to the real structure of the world, they are in fact quite likely 
to be true. Successful predictions based on the theory are thus particularly strong mo-
tivations for believing that we have indeed found a natural classification. 
 This combination of a dismissal of explanatory theories and an acceptance of what 
can be read as an argument for scientific realism has led to quite a bit of literature 
about Duhem’s position in the realism debate (e.g., Lugg 1990; Darling 2003; Dion 
2013). In addition, his ideas about how a natural classification allows us to grasp the 
structure of a relationship but not the nature of the underlying reality has been an im-
portant source of inspiration for structural realism (Worrall 1989). But our concerns in 
this paper are not with realism and antirealism, so I will bracket these issues. 
 Can we use Duhem’s notion of a natural classification in contemporary discussions 
about scientific understanding? The basic idea—that there is a kind of classification 
that gives us understanding without explanation, and that we recognize this kind of 
classification from its inductive success—seems very usable. But Duhem’s own ac-
count of naturalness has several weaknesses that we will have to overcome. 
Unification as a Measure of Natural Classification 
Theoria 79 (2014): 71-82 
75 
 Duhem defines a natural classification as a classification in which the ideal relations 
postulated by the theory correspond to the real relations in nature. For our purposes, 
there are three problems with this approach: 
• Duhemian naturalness is a primarily metaphysical concept. But we would like to 
connect naturalness to understanding, which is a primarily epistemic concept. 
• It is unclear on Duhem’s terms whether we can ever be justified in believing 
that a classification is natural; and clarifying this would mean taking up a posi-
tion in the realism debate. When we are theorising about scientific understand-
ing, we would prefer to have a measure of naturalness that can be uncontrover-
sially applied; and we would prefer to remain agnostic about realism and antire-
alism. 
• Duhem’s notion of a ‘real relation’ is anyway unclear. Given a set of objects, 
there is presumably always some relation that they bear to each other. How do 
we select the ‘real’ relations from among all relations? And can we do this with-
out sinking into the quagmire of metaphysics? 
 Next to the criterion that the ideal relations must correspond to the real relations, 
the second ingredient of Duhem’s approach is the idea that we can recognize natural-
ness from inductive success. We will assume that Duhem is onto something here: a 
classification is natural, and gives us understanding about nature, if it describes more 
of nature than we explicitly put into it. Given the problems with Duhem’s definition 
of naturalness in terms of correspondence with real relations, it seems worthwhile to 
investigate whether it is possible to use inductive success as a definition of naturalness 
rather than merely a sign of it. 
 However, Duhem’s own notion of inductive success is vague. Furthermore, where 
he becomes more concrete—in putting special emphasis on unexpected successful 
predictions—the results seem to be counter-intuitive. For if a theory has more induc-
tive success if its correct predictions were unexpected, then its naturalness will depend 
on the idiosyncratic details of the history of science. But naturalness and understand-
ing (perhaps unlike justification) seem to be notions that should not have that de-
pendence, as we know from discussions about the problem of old and new evidence. 
We want a notion of inductive success that is independent of the development of sci-
ence. 
 This brings me to the following set of desiderata for a measure of the naturalness 
of classifications: 
1. It should allow us to actually measure naturalness (e.g., no dependence on an 
unknowable hidden reality). 
2. It should be a measure of inductive success. 
3. That inductive success should be conceived of ahistorically. 
4. It should be applicable to classifications broadly conceived: not just ‘grouping 
objects under headings’, but also complicated scientific theories. 
5. When we look at examples of clearly natural or clearly unnatural classifications, 
it should give the right verdict. 
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 Of this list, 1, 2 and 3 have already been discussed, and 5 is self-evident. So let me 
just say a few words about 4. For Duhem, classification is a very broad notion: optics 
is a classification of phenomena, and so is Newtonian physics, even though these  
theories do much more than just dividing the phenomena into a set of mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive sets (which would be a more narrow definition of classifica-
tion). Since such theories presumably give us scientific understanding—even if their 
explanatory, e.g., causal, claims would turn out to be false—we will join Duhem in 
thinking of them as potentially natural classifications. This means that our measure of 
naturalness must be applicable to such theories. 
 In sections 3 and 4 I will argue that Schurz and Lambert’s theory of unification fits 
these desiderata, and is therefore a good candidate for a measure of naturalness. 
3. Schurz-and-Lambert-unification 
In this section, I will first present a simplified and amended version of the theory of 
Schurz and Lambert 1994 (see also Schurz 1999), and then explain what the simplifi-
cations and amendments consist in. 
 We start with the cognitive corpus C of a scientist or a scientific community. C 
consists of two parts: the set of accepted statements KNOW, and the set of accepted 
inference patterns I. We will not pay much attention to I, assuming that it contains just 
the generally accepted forms of deductive, inductive and probabilistic reasoning, and 
no ‘weird’ or ‘deviant’ forms of reasoning. We will also assume that KNOW is logically 
closed under the accepted inference patterns—i.e., we assume a situation of logical 
omniscience. 
 KNOW is of course infinite. Because we want to count statements later, we need to 
use the method of knowledge representation by relevant elements (Schurz and Lam-
bert 1994, 88-91) to pair KNOW down to a finite set of relevant elements—the details 
of this procedure will not be described here (but see Schurz’s discussion in this       
volume, pp. 60-61). We call this paired down set K. 
 We next make a distinction in K between data and hypotheses. A datum is a statement 
describing a natural phenomenon that we have observed, while a hypothesis is a 
statement that is part of the theory we have formulated to summarize and classify (and 
maybe explain) the data. As used here, this distinction is not supposed to commit us 
to the idea of a pure observation language in which the data are ‘given’. Rather,     
what we need is a distinction—made in any way that one deems philosophically       
acceptable—between that which needs to be classified and that which classifies. Per-
haps the idea of data can be clarified using the notion of an observation language; 
perhaps it can be clarified using more sophisticated ideas, such as Azzouni’s (2000) 
notion of evidentially central content; or perhaps we have to think of data as the set of 
statements that a scientific community accepts as beyond rational discussion. For our 
purposes we can remain agnostic about this. We will also ignore the question whether 
what are data will change when theory changes, interesting though this question is. 
Only two things are important: that the distinction between data and hypotheses can 
be made; and that the distinction has enough pre-theoretical clarity that we can discuss 
examples of classification without having to make the distinction fully explicit. That 
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pre-theoretical clarity does seem to exist. For instance, everyone will agree that “this 
lump is yellow” is a better candidate for a datum than “the atomic number of gold is 
79”. 
 With the distinction between data and hypotheses in place, we can start defining 
unification. The set K is to be divided into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive subsets: the basic phenomena and the assimilated phenomena. This division must follow 
the rule that all assimilated phenomena can be inferred from the basic phenomena us-
ing inferences in I. 
 That criterion will usually not pick out a unique division. The second criterion is 
that of all divisions that conform to the first criterion, the division that achieves the 
greatest unification is the division that must be chosen. 
 How do we calculate which division leads to the greatest unification? We use the 
following four rules: 
• A datum that is basic gives 0 unification. 
• A datum that is assimilated gives +Wd unification. 
• A hypothesis that is basic gives –Wh unification. 
• A hypothesis that is assimilated gives 0 unification. 
 The rationale behind these rules is as follows. Basic data are our starting point, and 
so we assign them neither positive nor negative unification. Our knowledge doesn’t 
become more or less unified just because we make more observations; unification 
comes from our classifications. 
 When we introduce hypotheses, these come with an intrinsic unification cost.   
Hypotheses that do not allow us to assimilate any data are just dead weight, wheels on 
the machine that do not turn; and therefore we assign them a negative value –Wh. But 
hypotheses can pay for themselves by assimilating data. Assimilated data, data that can 
be derived from our classificatory theories, are the positive currency of unification, 
and we therefore assign them a positive value +Wd. 
 Finally, hypotheses that can be inferred from other hypotheses are assigned a zero 
value: they do no increase unification, but neither do they needlessly add to the com-
plexity of the system. (Once we have paid for Newton’s laws, we get Kepler’s laws for 
free.) 
 To illustrate this, let us look at a simple example. Suppose we have n lumps of mat-
ter, and suppose that K consists of the following 3n statements, with i running from 1 
to n: 
 Lump i is yellow. Lump i has a melting point of 1337 K. Lump i is quite soft. 
None of these statements can be inferred from any of the others; and we assume that 
all of them are data. So we have 3n basic data, which gives us a total unification of 0. 
 Now we add the following statements to K: 
 Lump i is gold. All gold is yellow. All gold is quite soft. All gold has a melting 
point of 1337 K. 
None of these statements are inferable from any of the others, so we here have n+3 
basic hypotheses. However, the 3n basic data statements we started out with are all in-
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ferable from these hypotheses, so they now count as assimilated data. The total unifi-
cation of our new K is therefore 3nWd – (n+3)Wh. 
 Whether this is positive or negative depends on the values of Wd and Wh. Since a 
hypothesis must surely assimilate more than one datum before we are justified in 
adopting it, Wh > Wd. But does a hypothesis have to assimilate 2, or 3, or 5, or 11 data 
before we are justified in adopting it? There is probably no precise answer to such a 
question. Furthermore, the assumption that all data and all hypotheses come with the 
same values Wd and Wh should be regarded as a simplification. Schurz and Lambert 
defend the plausible claim that general hypotheses like “all gold is yellow” are more 
costly than particular hypotheses like “lump 118 is gold”. Again, there is probably no 
way to determine precisely how much greater—different scientists will have different 
opinions. This means that calculating unification is not an exact science; but neither 
does it have to be. Scientists themselves can have rational disagreements about  
whether or not a certain classification is worth the trouble, or which of several classifi-
cations is the most natural one (as the many debates about biological classification 
have amply illustrated). 
 But we can say this: given enough lumps and enough properties that can be linked 
to being gold, there will certainly be a point at which the introduction of a theory 
about gold will increase unification, and will therefore be worth the trouble. This is 
exactly what we would expect. 
 In section 4, I will argue that SL-unification (as I will abbreviate ‘Schurz-and-
Lambert-unification’) is a good measure of the naturalness of a classification. But I 
first need to point out several differences between my presentation of Schurz and 
Lambert theory. 
 In condensing their 56-page paper to two pages, I have obviously made many sim-
plifications. The most interesting of these is that Schurz and Lambert’s distinguish not 
just between basic and assimilated statements, but that they also add the categories of 
dissimilated and heuristically assimilated statements. This is a fruitful and important 
idea, but too involved to explain here. I have also left out the erotetic framework 
adopted by these authors; their interest in shifts in opinion; and the possibility of 
changing the store of accepted inferences. The reader is advised to consult the original 
article for its many fascinating ideas. 
 But there is something else that I have left out not because of reasons of space, but 
because for our current purposes, it must be removed from the notion of SL-
unification. Schurz and Lambert want to ensure that the inferences of the most unify-
ing theory correspond to real relations between the phenomena. As an important exam-
ple, they prefer inferences that capture the real causal structure of the world to infer-
ences that do not. Because of this preference, they give a unification bonus to infer-
ences that fit into a system of general principles of causality. 
 Now causal inferences are typically explanatory, as the dominance of causal theo-
ries of explanation testifies, and a preference for causal inferences is no doubt due to 
Schurz and Lambert’s wish to give a unificationist theory of explanation. But since our 
purpose is to look at classifications prior to the addition of any explanatory principles 
(including causation), we should not adopt this idea. 
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 There are additional reasons for preferring a notion of SL-unification that remains 
agnostic about explanatory principles. Gijsbers (2007) argues that unification cannot 
be a criterion for explanation; if this is correct, then adding a principle to our notion 
of unification based on the idea that unification can be such a criterion is misguided. 
Furthermore, Gijsbers (2013) argues that unification leads to a kind of understanding 
that is simply different from the understanding provided by explanation. So while it 
may be true that scientists prefer, say, causal theories to non-causal ones, it seems a 
good idea to keep this preference conceptually distinct from their preference for uni-
fied theories. For these reasons, I believe that we should strip away the preference for 
causal theories from the notion of SL-unification. 
4. Unification and naturalness 
We are now in a position to consider the following thesis: 
 SL-unification is the measure for the naturalness of a classification. If it makes 
sense to speak of the natural classification of a domain of phenomena, that nat-
ural classification will be the theoretical structure that achieves the highest 
amount of SL-unification. 
 Since we already formulated five desiderata for a measure of naturalness, we can 
simply check whether SL-unification has these desired properties. 
1. SL-unification can indeed be used to actually measure naturalness: it is calculat-
ed based on the set of accepted statements, not based on anything that is un-
known or even unknowable. 
2. SL-unification is a measure of inductive success. Positive unification is generat-
ed by inferring data from other statements; if we can predict more of the data, 
we have higher unification—assuming, that is, that we do not have to add a 
disproportionate amount of new theory in order to increase the amount of data 
that can be inferred. This is as it should be: we reach maximal inductive success 
at the point where we have the best balance between the amount of data we can 
assimilate and the amount of theory we need in order to do that. 
3. SL-unification is calculated based on the set of accepted statements, independ-
ent of how and in what order those statements came to be accepted. It is thus 
appropriately ahistorical. 
4. SL-unification can be calculated for any theory that has inferential consequenc-
es, which is, presumably, anything that could be called a theory. It can therefore 
be applied to the entire range of scientific theories. 
5. Whether SL-unification agrees with our intuitive judgements about naturalness 
is an open question that cannot be decided in a simple way. 
 We see that SL-unification performs well on the first four desiderata. To get more 
insight into the fifth, we will look at two examples: a simple case also discussed by 
Schurz and Lambert under the heading of ‘spurious classification of the first kind’, 
and a more complicated case involving double classification. 
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Example 1: virtus dormitiva 
Suppose we have a set of n substances that put people to sleep. The n statements 
“substance X puts people to sleep” are basic data. We now add the n hypotheses that 
“substance X has a virtus dormitiva”, and the hypothesis “anything with a virtus dor-
mitiva puts people to sleep”. This is a well-known example of an unnatural classifica-
tion; so it should have negative SL-unification. Does it? 
 The positive unification is n Wd. The negative unification is (n+1) Wh. Since Wh > 
Wd, we get the correct answer that the total SL-unification will be negative. Adding 
new theoretical categories that correspond 1-on-1 with pre-existing phenomenal cate-
gories does not lead to natural classifications. 
Example 2: whales as mammals and as fish 
Suppose that we already have theories of mammals and fish in place (they have been 
paid for, and we will not consider their costs and general benefits in the rest of exam-
ple). For simplicity, we assume that these theories have the following form: if we have 
a statement that says that a certain animal is a mammal (or a fish), we then have non-
deductive inferences in I that allow us to infer that this animal has each of a certain set 
of properties. So, if we know that cats are mammals, we can infer that cats have two 
eyes, have a backbone, are hot-blooded, and so on. The inferences are non-deductive 
because we allow for the possibility that they are blocked by other accepted state-
ments, e.g. the statement “in terms of laying eggs, the platypus is not mammal-like”. 
 Suppose furthermore that we have already classified whales as mammals, because 
many of their properties get assimilated once we do so. Here is the question we need 
to ask: does it make sense to also classify whales as fish? After all, several of their 
properties did not get assimilated by classifying them as mammals, but would get as-
similated by classifying them as fish. The answer should be no: classifying whales as 
fish has been considered an unnatural move by modern biologists. Does the notion of 
SL-unification support this judgement? 
 Take all properties that our theory of fish ascribes to fish. This set can be divided 
into three parts. X contains those properties that whales have, but that already got   
assimilated when whales were classified as mammals. Y contains those properties that 
whales have, and that did not get assimilated when they were classified as mammals; 
and Z contains those properties that whales do not have. To give some examples, X 
contains ‘have a backbone’ and ‘are warm-blooded’; Y contains ‘have fins’ and ‘live in 
water’; and Z contains ‘are cold-blooded’ and ‘have gills’. 
 What is the unification effect of classifying whales as fish? The properties in X do 
nothing. The properties in Y give a positive unification effect, since every statement of 
the form “whales possess property a” with a in Y gets assimilated. But the properties 
in Z give a negative unification effect, because we must block the incorrect inferences 
they give rise to. (In fact, the formally correct way to represent this negative unifica-
tion effect is to move the statements that whales do not have the properties in Z to 
the category of dissimilated statements. But, as indicated in section 3, I have not dis-
cussed that part of Schurz and Lambert’s theory. It does not matter for our example.) 
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 Now Z is bigger than Y: once we control for the properties of mammals, whales 
share only a few properties with fish, while they lack many distinctively fishy proper-
ties. So the unification effect of classifying whales as fish will be negative. The notion 
of SL-unification allows us to correctly identify this attempted classification as unnatu-
ral. 
 (One might argue that in current biology, the classification of whales as fish would 
be rejected because it doesn't fit our ideas of evolutionary history. This may be the 
case; explanatory theories will often influence the way we classify things, and it is in no 
way the aim of this paper to argue that scientists often or generally rely on pure classi-
fication rather than on explanatory theories. But they could do so and still get some 
understanding of the natural world.) 
Examples could and should be multiplied, of course, in order to strengthen the case 
that SL-unification captures naturalness. But in the limited space of this paper, these 
two examples will have to suffice. We thus see that SL-unification performs well on all 
five desiderata that we formulated for a measure of naturalness. 
5. Conclusion 
Recent interest in the idea that there can be scientific understanding without explana-
tion lends new relevance to Duhem’s notion of natural classification, since he argued 
that natural classifications can teach us something about nature without being explana-
tory. However, Duhem’s conception of naturalness leaves much to be desired from 
our point of view. In this paper, I have argued that unification as defined by Schurz 
and Lambert has the desired properties for a measure of the naturalness of classifica-
tion. If this is true, SL-unification measures a type of scientific understanding that un-
til now has been somewhat neglected in the philosophical literature. It also means that 
we can use this notion to add some much-needed precision to discussions of scientific 
understanding. 
 Whether the identification between SL-unification and naturalness is tenable 
should of course be studied further; the few examples discussed in this paper cannot 
conclusively justify this identification. But we have at least some initial justification for 
believing the thesis. 
 Incidentally, if the thesis proves to be correct, this could also have effects on de-
bates about structural realism. Since structural realists have often appealed to Duhem’s 
ideas about classification, it might well turn out that the quasi-quantitative approach of 
Schurz and Lambert can be applied to case studies in the literature on structural real-
ism. But judging the plausibility of such an approach lies beyond the scope of this  
paper. 
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